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CREDIT SEGMENTATION IN GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM
SEBASTIA´N CEA-ECHENIQUE AND JUAN PABLO TORRES-MARTI´NEZ
Abstract. We build a general equilibrium model with endogenous borrowing constraints com-
patible with credit segmentation. There are personalized trading restrictions connecting prices
with both portfolio constraints and consumption possibilities, a setting which has not thoroughly
been addressed by the literature. Our approach is general enough to be compatible with incom-
plete market economies where there exist wealth-dependent and/or investment-dependent credit
access, borrowing constraints precluding bankruptcy, or assets backed by physical collateral.
To prove equilibrium existence, we assume that both investment on segmented assets is not
required to obtain access to credit and transfers implementable in segmented markets can be super-
replicated by investing in non-segmented markets. For instance, this super-replication property
is satisfied if either (i) all individuals have access to borrow at a risk-free rate; or (ii) financial
contracts make real promises in terms of non-perishable commodities; or (iii) promises are backed
by physical collateral.
Keywords. Incomplete Markets; General Equilibrium; Endogenous Trading Constraints.
JEL Classification. D52, D54.
1. Introduction
The differentiated access to commodity or asset markets endogenously emerges due to regulatory
or institutional considerations. As a consequence, several kinds of trading restrictions are observed
in financial markets: margin calls, collateral requirements, consumption quotas or income-based
access to funding, among others. With the aim of understanding the effects of those restrictions
in competitive markets, a vast literature of general equilibrium has been developed. That research
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has given consideration to models where financial trade is restricted by fixed, price-dependent, or
consumption-dependent portfolio constraints. Nevertheless, channels connecting prices with both
portfolio constraints and consumption possibilities have not thoroughly been addressed by the lit-
erature. The objective of this paper is to contribute to this direction.
We analyze the existence of equilibria in a two period economy where agents are subject to
price-dependent credit constraints that affect the access to physical and financial markets. Our
approach is general enough to be compatible with incomplete market economies where there exists,
for instance, wealth-dependent and/or investment-dependent credit access, borrowing constraints
precluding bankruptcy, and assets backed by physical collateral.
In order to make credit segmentation compatible with the existence of a competitive equilibrium,
we assume that both investment on segmented assets is not required to obtain access to credit and
assets payments can be super-replicated either by deliveries of non-perishable commodities or by the
promises of assets that all agents can short-sale. For instance, this latter property holds when either
(i) individuals have access to borrow resources through a portfolio making positive payments at all
states of nature where remaining assets pay (e.g. a risk-free asset); or (ii) all assets are real and
promises are measured in units of non-perishable commodities; or (iii) debts are backed by physical
collateral. In addition to our results of equilibrium existence, we provide examples clarifying the
relevance of the super-replication assumption.
The related literature is described in the next section. In Sections 3 and 4 we state our model and
introduce the basic assumptions over individuals’ characteristics and trading constraints. Sections
5 is devoted to discuss our main assumptions and results, whose proofs are given in the Appendix.
2. Insertion in the Literature
The existence of competitive equilibria was deeply studied in incomplete markets models where
agents are subject to exogenous portfolio constraints. The case of portfolio restrictions determined
by linear equality constraints is addressed by Balasko, Cass and Siconolfi (1990) for nominal as-
sets, and by Polemarchakis and Siconolfi (1997) for real assets. When portfolio restrictions are
determined by convex and closed sets containing zero, the case of nominal or nume´raire assets is
studied by Cass (1984, 2006), Siconolfi (1989), Cass, Siconolfi and Villanacci (2001), Martins-da-
Rocha and Triki (2005), Won and Hahn (2007, 2012), Aouani and Cornet (2009, 2011), and Cornet
and Gopalan (2010). In the same context, the case of real assets is analyzed by Radner (1972),
Angeloni and Cornet (2006), and Aouani and Cornet (2011). In general terms, these authors prove
equilibrium existence requiring non-redundancy hypotheses over financial structures and/or finan-
cial survival requirements. Under these assumptions, individuals’ allocations and asset prices can
be endogenously bounded without inducing frictions in the model.
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There are several results that include price-dependent portfolio constraints in nominal or real
assets markets. These models assume that financial constraints are determined by a finite number
of inequalities, and use differentiable techniques to ensure the existence of equilibrium and to analyze
its stability and local-uniqueness. In this context, equilibrium existence is addressed by Carosi, Gori
and Villanacci (2009) for nume´raire asset markets with portfolio constraints, by Gori, Pireddu and
Villanacci (2013) for nume´raire and real asset markets with borrowing constraints, and by Hoelle,
Pireddu, and Villanacci (2012) for real asset markets with wealth-dependent credit limits.
In addition to these approaches, Seghir and Torres-Mart´ınez (2011) propose a model where trading
constraints restrict the access to debt in terms of first-period consumption. Financial survival
conditions are not required. However, they assume that preferences are such that individuals may
compensate the losses on well-being generated by reductions of future consumption with increments
in present demand.
We contribute to this literature with a model where borrowing constraints make the access to
liquidity dependent on prices, investment, and consumption. Since we want to make trading con-
straints compatible with credit market segmentation, we do not impose financial survival conditions.
Also, financial constraints are not necessarily determined by a finite number of inequalities and in-
dividual’s preferences are not restricted by differentiable assumptions or by impatience conditions
as in Seghir and Torres-Mart´ınez (2011). Alternatively, we suppose that assets payments can be
super-replicated either by deliveries of non-perishable commodities or by the promises of assets that
all agents can short-sale.
3. Model
We consider a two-period economy with uncertainty about the realization of a state of nature in
the second period, which belongs to a finite set S. Let S = {0} ∪ S be the set of states of nature in
the economy, where s = 0 denotes the unique state at the first period.
There is a finite set L of perfectly divisible commodities, which are subject to transformation
between periods and can be traded in spot markets at prices p = (ps)s∈S ∈ RL×S+ . We model
the transformation of commodities between periods by linear technologies (Ys)s∈S . Thus, a bundle
y ∈ RL+ demanded at the first period is transformed, after its consumption and the realization of a
state of nature s ∈ S, into the bundle Ysy ∈ RL+.
There is a finite set J of financial contracts available for trade at the first period that make
promises contingent to the realization of uncertainty. Let q = (qj)j∈J ∈ RJ+ be the vector of asset
prices and denote by Rj(p) = (Rs,j(p))s∈S ∈ RS+ the vector of payments associated to asset j ∈ J .1
1Our financial structure is general enough to be compatible with several types of assets. For instance, to include
a nominal asset j it is sufficient to assume that there is (Ns,j)s∈S ∈ RS+ such that Rs,j ≡ Ns,j , ∀s ∈ S. To include a
real asset k we can define payments Rs,k(p) = ps ·As,k, ∀s ∈ S, where (As,k)s∈S ∈ RL×S+ .
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For notation convenience, let P := (RL+×RJ+ \ {0})× (RL+ \ {0})S be the space of commodity and
asset prices ((p0, q), (ps)s∈S) satisfying (p0, q) 6= 0 and ps 6= 0,∀s ∈ S. Also, let E := RL×S+ ×RJ be
the space of consumption and portfolio allocations.
There is a finite set I of consumers that may trade assets in order to smooth their consumption.
Each agent i ∈ I has a utility function V i : RL×S+ → R and endowments wi = (wis)s∈S ∈ RL×S+ .
Let W i = (W is)s∈S := (w
i
0, (w
i
s + Ysw
i
0)s∈S) be the aggregated endowments of agent i ∈ I.
Each individual i is subject to personalized trading constraints, which are determined by a cor-
respondence Φi : P E. Notice that, agents may be subject to endogenous borrowing constraints,
as the access to liquidity can depend on prices, investment and consumption. We assume that there
are no restrictions on investment, i.e., Φi(p, q) + RL×S+ × RJ+ ⊆ Φi(p, q), ∀(p, q) ∈ P, ∀i ∈ I.2
Given prices (p, q) ∈ P, each agent i chooses a consumption bundle xi = (xis)s∈S and a portfolio
zi = (zij)j∈J in her choice set C
i(p, q), which is characterized by the vectors (xi, zi) ∈ Φi(p, q)
satisfying the following budget restrictions:
p0 · xi0 + q · zi ≤ p0 · wi0; ps · xis ≤ ps · (wis + Ysxi0) +
∑
j∈J
Rs,j(p)z
i
j , ∀s ∈ S.
Definition 1. A vector ((p, q), (xi, zi)i∈I) ∈ P × EI is a competitive equilibrium for the economy
with endogenous trading constraints when the following conditions hold:
(i) Each agent i ∈ I maximizes her preferences, (xi, zi) ∈ argmax(xi,zi)∈Ci(p,q) V i(xi).
(ii) Individuals’ plans are market feasible,
∑
i∈I(x
i −W i, zi) = 0.
Our objective is to determine conditions that make price-dependent trading constraints {Φi}i∈I
compatible with equilibrium existence, even in the presence of credit market segmentation, which
means that there are contracts that not all agents can short-sale, i.e.,
{j ∈ J : ∃i ∈ I, (xi, zi) ∈ Φi(p, q) =⇒ zij ≥ 0, ∀(p, q) ∈ P} 6= ∅.
Notice that, the existence of credit market segmentation is not compatible with financial survival .3
This assumption requires, independent of prices, that all agents have access to liquidity at the first
2At the cost of additional complexity, our model could be generalized to include price-dependent investment
constraints (see Cea-Echenique and Torres-Mart´ınez (2014)).
3Some authors impose a financial survival condition which is independent of physical endowments, although is still
incompatible with credit segmentation: given non-arbitrage financial prices, all agents have access to some amount
of liquidity by short-selling promises (see, for instance, Aouani and Cornet (2009, Assumption FN2), Aouani and
Cornet (2011, Assumption FS)).
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period by either selling physical endowments or short-selling assets:
⋂
(p,q)∈P
{i ∈ I : ∃(xi, zi) ∈ Φi(p, q), p0 · wi0 − q · zi > 0} = I. 4
Our approach to trading constraints is general enough to include, as particular cases, exogenous
borrowing constraints or price-dependent borrowing constraints. More precisely, an agent i is subject
to exogenous borrowing constraints if Φi(p, q) = RL×S+ ×Zi, where Zi+RJ+ ⊆ Zi. Alternatively, she
is burden by price-dependent borrowing constraints when Φi(p, q) = {(xi, zi) ∈ E : zi + gik(p, q) ≥
0, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,mi}}, where gik : P→ RJ+ , for every i ∈ I and k ∈ {1, . . . ,mi}.
Example 1. Suppose that J = {j1, j2, j3} and, for each (p, q) ∈ P and i ∈ I, we have that
(xi, zi) ∈ Φi(p, q) ⇐⇒

zij1 ∈ [min{p0 · (τ1 − wi0), 0},+∞);
zij2 ∈ [min{p0 · (wi0 − τ2), 0},+∞);
zij3 ∈
[
min
{
K −∑k∈J ′ qkzik, 0} ,+∞) ;
where τ1, τ2 ∈ RL+, K > 0 and J ′ ⊆ J \ {j3}.
Then, it follows that j1 is a credit line available for high income agents, because agent i can
short-sale it if and only if the value of her first period endowment is greater than the threshold
p0τ1. Analogously, only low-income agents can short-sale asset j2. In addition, the access to credit
through asset j3 depends on the amount of investment in some financial contracts, i.e., only investors
expending an amount greater than K in assets belonging to J ′ have access to short-sale j3. 2
Example 2. Since trading constraints may induce restrictions on consumption, we can allow for
derivative contracts as commodity options. Indeed, let j ∈ J be a financial contract such that, for
every (p, q) ∈ P and i ∈ I,
Rs,j(p) = max{Ysy −K, 0}, ∀s ∈ S; (xi, zi) ∈ Φi(p, q) =⇒ xi0 + κ y min{zij , 0} ≥ 0,
where y ∈ RL+, K > 0 and κ ∈ [0, 1). Then, j is a commodity option that gives the right to buy
in the second period, at a strike price K, the bundle obtained by the transformation of y through
time. To short-sell this option, agents are required to buy a portion κ of y as guarantee. 2
4Since financial survival is a property defined on the whole space of prices P—which includes vectors (p, q) such
that p0 is zero—it may not hold even when preferences are strictly monotonic and physical endowments are interior
points of the commodity space.
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Example 3. We can include debt constraints that depend of consumption decisions. For instance,
assume that there is κ ∈ (0, 1) such that, for any (p, q) ∈ P and for some i ∈ I,
(xi, zi) ∈ Φi(p, q) =⇒ κps · (wis + Ysxi0) +
∑
j∈J
Rs,j(p) min{zij , 0} ≥ 0, ∀s ∈ S,
where
∑
s∈S Rs,j(p) > 0 for each j ∈ J . Then, agent i’s debt is not greater than an exogenously-
fixed portion κ of her physical-resources’ value. If a portion ρ > κ of physical resources can be
garnished in case of bankruptcy, the above restriction ensures that i honors her commitments. 2
4. Basic Assumptions
The following are the basic hypotheses over fundamentals:
Assumption (A1)
(i) For any i ∈ I, V i is continuous, strictly quasi-concave, and locally non-satiated at each s ∈ S.5
(ii) One of following hypotheses hold:
(a) For each (s, l) ∈ S × L, there exists i ∈ I such that V i is strictly increasing in xs,l.
In addition, W i  0, ∀i ∈ I.6
(b) There exists i ∈ I such that, for each (s, l) ∈ S × L, V i is strictly increasing in xs,l.
In addition, W ks 6= 0, ∀(k, s) ∈ I × S and W i  0.
(iii) Asset payments are continuous functions of prices satisfying Rj(p) 6= 0, ∀j ∈ J , ∀p 0.
Assumption (A2)
The correspondences {Φi}i∈I are lower hemicontinuous with convex values and closed graph relative
to P× E. In addition, agents are not burden to trade assets, i.e., (0, 0) ∈ ⋂
(p,q)∈P
Φi(p, q), ∀i ∈ I.
Under (A1)-(A2) individuals’ choice set correspondences {Ci}i∈I vary continuously with prices
and, therefore, they do not compromise the continuity of individual demands (see Lemma 1).
5Strict quasi-concavity requires that, given xi, yi ∈ RL×S+ , V i(λxi + (1 − λ)yi) > min{V i(xi), V i(yi)} when
V i(xi) 6= V i(yi) and λ ∈ (0, 1). Local non-satiation at state of nature s requires that, for each (xik)k∈S ∈ RL×S+ and
 > 0 there exists yis ∈ RL+ such that, ‖yis − xis‖ <  and V i((xik)k 6=s, yis) > V i((xi)k∈S).
6The interiority of physical endowments is a traditional assumption in models with heterogenous access to financial
markets (see, for instance, Siconolfi (1989); Polemarchakis and Siconolfi (1997); Cass, Siconolfi and Villanacci (2001);
Carosi, Gori and Villanaci (2009); Aouani and Cornet (2009, 2011); Cornet and Gopalan (2011)). Furthermore, it is
not clear that (A2)(ii) can be relaxed without compromise the generality of our approach to credit segmentation. In
fact, although Gottardi and Hens (1996) shown the existence of equilibria in incomplete markets when endowments lie
in the boundary of the consumption set and preferences are strictly monotonic, their result requires that any subset
of individuals can redistributed resources—through financial trade—to the complementary subset of individuals.
 
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de laSorbonne - 2014.95R (Version révisée)
CREDIT SEGMENTATION IN GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM 7
When borrowing constraints are independent of prices and given by Φi(p, q) = RL×S+ × Zi, with
Zi +RJ+ ⊆ Zi, Assumption (A2) holds if and only if {Zi}i∈I are closed and convex sets containing
zero. Alternatively, if individuals are burden by price-dependent borrowing constraints, i.e.,
Φi(p, q) := {(xi, zi) ∈ E : zi + gik(p, q) ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,mi}}, ∀i ∈ I,
then Assumption (A2) holds if and only if gik : P→ R is continuous for every i ∈ I and 1 ≤ k ≤ mi.
As in Seghir and Torres-Mart´ınez (2011), we can include trading constraints determining restric-
tions on borrowing and first-period consumption,
Φi(p, q) := {(xi, zi) ∈ E : ∃(θi, ϕi) ∈ RJ+ × RJ+ , ϕi ∈ Ψi(xi0) ∧ zi = θi − ϕi },
where Ψi : RL+  RJ+ . In this context, if {Ψi}i∈I have a closed and convex graph and 0 ∈ Ψi(xi0) for
each xi0 ∈ RL+, then Assumption (A2) is satisfied. Furthermore, if Ψi(xi0) ⊆ Ψi(yi0) for each yi0 ≥ xi0,
then we can ensure that Φi(p, q)+RL×S+ ×RJ+ ⊆ Φi(p, q), ∀(p, q) ∈ P. We remark that our approach
is complementary to Seghir and Torres-Mart´ınez (2011), because at the cost of a non-redundancy
assumption and a super-replication property (see Assumptions (A3) and (A4) below) we neither
restrict individual preferences nor require {Ψi}i∈I to have compact values.
5. Equilibrium Existence
We analyze the existence of a competitive equilibrium using standard fixed point techniques.
For this reason, we want to ensure that endogenous variables can be bounded without affecting
individual’s behavior or excess of demand correspondences.
As was pointed out by Hart (1975), even without trading constraints, equilibrium may cease to
exists when markets are incomplete, assets are real, and admissible short-sales are unbounded. For
this reason, we induce upper bounds on individual variables through restrictions over the correspon-
dence of attainable allocations Ω : P EI , which is given by
Ω(p, q) :=
{
((xi, zi))i∈I ∈
∏
i∈I
Ci(p, q) :
∑
i∈I
(xi, zi) =
∑
i∈I
(W i, 0)
}
.
Assumption (A3)
For any compact set P′ ⊆ P, ⋃
(p,q)∈P′:(p,q)0
Ω(p, q) is bounded.
Since market-feasible consumption allocations are bounded, the objective of (A3) is to guarantee
the existence of bounds on market-feasible financial positions. Essentially, there are three indepen-
dent factors which contribute to ensure that (A3) holds: the specification of trading constraints, the
non-negativity of consumption, and the restrictions imposed by market feasibility.
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Thus, for instance, Assumption (A3) holds as a consequence of the specification of trading con-
straints and market feasibility when there are short-sale constraints: for some continuous function
m : P → RJ+ and for every (xi, zi) ∈ Φi(p, q), zi ≥ −m(p, q), ∀i ∈ I, ∀(p, q) ∈ P. Alternatively, the
non-negativity of consumption guarantees (A3) when J is composed by non-redundant nominal as-
sets. Furthermore, if debts are backed by physical collateral, then market feasibility induces bounds
on portfolios as a consequence of the scarcity of durable goods.
Notice that, Assumption (A3) is satisfied by trading constraints described in Example 1 and by
any financial market composed by contracts as those described in Examples 2 and 3.
In the following result we illustrate how Assumption (A3) is related with a non-redundancy con-
dition over the financial structure, which avoids the existence of unbounded sequences of trading
admissible portfolios that do not generate transfers at the second period.
Proposition. Under (A1)(ii)(a) and (A2), Assumption (A3) holds when
(NR)
⋃
(p,q)∈P
⋃
i∈I
zi ∈ RJ \ {0} : ∑
j∈J
Rj(p)z
i
j = 0 ∧ (W i, δzi) ∈ Φi(p, q),∀δ > 0
 = ∅.
Condition (NR) is a generalization of the hypothesis of non-redundancy introduced by Siconolfi
(1989, Assumption (A5)) in nominal asset markets with exogenous portfolio constraints.7 It holds,
for instance, when {Rj(p)}j∈J is linearly independent for every (p, q) ∈ P. Hence, for instance,
Assumption (A3) is satisfied in a market composed by just two assets, a risk free nominal contract
and a real security making a promise A ∈ RL++ contingent to a state s0 ∈ S.
It is important to remark that, as the following example illustrates, even when assets are nominal
and trading constraints are independent of prices, the non-redundancy condition (NR) is stronger
than Assumption (A3).
Example 4. Assume that financial markets are composed by two risk-free nominal assets which
pay one unit of account at each state of nature in the second period. Also, there are two agents, A
and B, such that ΦA(p, q) = RL×S+ × [−1,+∞)×R and ΦB(p, q) = RL×S+ × [−1,+∞)× [−1,+∞).
7Indeed, assume that assets are nominal (i.e., for every (s, j) ∈ S × J , Rs,j(p) = Ns,j) and trading constraints
are given by exogenous portfolio restrictions (i.e., for every i ∈ I there is Zi ⊆ RJ such that Φi(p, q) = RL×S+ ×
Zi, ∀(p, q) ∈ P). Then, (NR) is satisfied if and only if
⋃
i∈I
{
zi ∈ RJ \ {0} : Nzi = 0 ∧ δzi ∈ Zi, ∀δ > 0
}
= ∅,
where N = (Ns,j)(s,j)∈S×J is the matrix of asset payments.
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Then, (A3) holds, because for any compact set P′ ⊆ P and for each (p, q) ∈ P′ we have that,
((xi, zi))i∈{A,B} ∈ Ω(p, q) =⇒ (xi, zi) ∈ [0, α]L×S × ([−1, 1]× [−β(P′), β(P′)]), ∀i ∈ {A,B},
where
α =
∑
(s,l)∈S×L
(WAs,l +W
B
s,l), β(P′) = 1 + max
(p,q)∈P′
∑
s∈S
ps(W
A
s +W
B
s ).
However, (NR) is not satisfied, because
(1,−1) ∈ {zA ∈ R2 \ {0} : zA1 + zA2 = 0 ∧ (WA, δzA) ∈ ΦA(p, q),∀δ > 0} . 2
To obtain upper bounds for prices, we restrict the heterogeneity of financial transfers through a
super-replication property , requiring that wealth transfers that are implementable by long positions
in segmented markets can be super-replicated by investments in non-segmented assets. Essentially,
as prices of commodities and unsegmented assets can be normalized without induce frictions on
individual behavior, the super-replication property allows us to find endogenous upper bounds for
non-arbitrage prices of segmented assets (see Lemma 3 in the Appendix).
In order to formalize these ideas, we need a previous definition: a contract j is unsegmented if
for every vector of prices (p, q) ∈ P there exists δ > 0 such that −δ~ej ∈
⋂
i∈I Φ
i(p, q), where ~ej ∈ E
is the allocation composed by just one unit of j. Let Ja be the set of unsegmented contracts.
Assumption (A4)
(i) For each compact set P′ ⊆ P, there exists (x̂0, ẑ) ∈ RL+ × RJa+ such that,∑
j∈J\Ja
Rs,j(p) ≤ ps · Ysx̂0 +
∑
k∈Ja
Rs,k(p)ẑk, ∀s ∈ S, ∀(p, q) ∈ P′.
(ii) Long-positions in contracts J \ Ja can be reduced without compromise trading admissibility.8
Notice that J \ Ja is the set of segmented credit contracts. Thus, Assumption (A4)(i) requires
that payments associated to segmented contracts can be super-replicated by positions on durable
goods and/or contracts that all agents can short-sale. In particular, the set of states of nature where
inter-temporal transfers are available is the same for all agents. Furthermore, when (A4)(ii) holds,
segmented contracts are not required as financial guarantees to obtain access to credit.
Our main result ensures that credit segmentation is compatible with equilibria:
Theorem. Under Assumptions (A1)-(A4) there is a competitive equilibrium.
8That is, given (xi, zi) ∈ Φi(p, q) and pi ∈ [0, 1), if zij > 0 for some j /∈ Ja, then (xi, (zik)k 6=j , pizij) ∈ Φi(p, q).
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We want to illustrate several situations where the super-replication property holds.
In the following result we assume that there is an asset that all agents can short-sale and whose
payments are positive whenever one of the remaining contracts has non-trivial promises. Note that,
this is satisfied when all agents have access to borrowing through a risk-free asset.
Corollary 1. Under Assumptions (A1)-(A3) and (A4)(ii), assume that there is an unsegmented
contract j ∈ Ja such that (Rs,j(p))s∈Sj  0, ∀(p, q) ∈ P, where Sj := {s ∈ S : ∃k 6= j, Rs,k 6= 0 }.
Then, a competitive equilibrium always exists.
The super-replication property also holds when assets’ promises are measure in units of non-
perishable commodities. Indeed, if we define L∗ := {l ∈ L : Ys(l, l) > 0, ∀s ∈
⋃
j Sj} as the
set of commodities that not-fully depreciate at the states of nature where financial contracts make
non-trivial promises, we have that:
Corollary 2. Under Assumptions (A1)-(A3) and (A4)(ii), there is a competitive equilibrium if
assets are real and promises are given in terms of commodities in L∗.
Our model is general enough to be compatible with the inclusion of default and non-recourse
collateralized assets. That is, assets whose promises are backed by non-perishable commodities such
that the only payment enforcement mechanism in case of default is given by the seizure of these
guarantees.9 In this direction, we can extend the model of Geanakoplos and Zame (2013) to include
financial market segmentation and price-dependent trading constraints.
More precisely, assume that each asset j ∈ J is characterized by a pair (Cj , (Ds,j(p))s∈S), where
Cj = (Cj,l)l∈L ∈ RL+ \{0} is the collateral guarantee and (Ds,j(p))s∈S ∈ RS+ are the state contingent
promises. Borrowers are required to pledge the associated collateral, i.e., for any (xi, zi) ∈ Φi(p, q)
we have that xi0 ≥
∑
j∈J Cj max{−zij , 0}. In addition, as the only enforcement in case of default
is the seizure of collateral guarantees, borrowers give strategic default, delivering the minimum
between collateral value and promises, i.e., Rs,j(p) := min{Ds,j(p), psYsCj}, ∀s ∈ S.
Notice that, payments associated to a non-recourse collateralized loan can be super-replicated by
the bundle of commodities used as guarantee. Hence, non-arbitrage asset prices can be bounded
from above by the collateral cost (see Appendix).
9In the absence of payment enforcement mechanisms over collateral repossession, the non-satiability of preferences
guarantees that borrowers of a collateralized loan always deliver the minimum between promises and collateral values.
Therefore, lenders that finance these loans perfectly foresight the payments that they will receive. Hence, as in
Geanakoplos and Zame (2013), we can capture with a same financial contract both the collateralized line of credit
and the collateralized loan obligation (CLO) that passthrough the payments made by borrowers.
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Corollary 3. Under Assumptions (A1)-(A3) and (A4)(ii) there exists a competitive equilibria in
collateralized asset markets.
Since Corollaries 2 and 3 do not require Ja 6= ∅, they are compatible with an extreme form of
financial segmentation: the exclusion of some agents from credit markets.
We conclude this section with some examples which highlight the difficulties to guarantee equilib-
rium existence when our assumptions are not satisfied. In the first one, we present an economy with-
out uncertainty where a competitive equilibrium cease to exists because both the super-replication
property and Assumption (A1)(ii) are not satisfied. In the second example, inspired by Hahn and
Won (2007, Example 5.1), we describe an economy where there do not exist equilibria because As-
sumption (A4) does not holds.
Example 5. Consider a two-period economy without uncertainty at the second period. There is a
perishable commodity, used as the numeraire, and a real asset j that promises to deliver one unit of
commodity at the second period. There are two agents, A and B, which are characterized by utility
functions V A(x0, x1) = V
B(x0, x1) =
√
x0 + 0.5
√
x1 and by endowments (w
A, wB) = ((1, 1), (1, 0)).
In addition, ΦA(p, q) = R2+ × R+ and ΦB(p, q) = R2+ × R. Hence, the real asset is segmented,
because only agent B can short-sale it.
It follows that Assumptions (A1)(i), (A1)(iii), (A2), (A3), and (A4)(ii) hold. However, since
the commodity is perishable and asset j is segmented, the super-replication property (A4)(i) is not
satisfied. Also, (A1)(ii) does not hold, because wB = (1, 0).
The failure of these assumptions implies that the economy does not have equilibria. Indeed, by
monotonicity of preferences the asset price q is strictly positive. Hence, Inada’s condition and bud-
get feasibility imply that the optimal portfolio of agent B belongs to (0, 1/q]. This is incompatible
with credit segmentation, because only B can short-sale j.10 2
10If ΦA(p, q) = R2+ × [−δ,+∞), for some δ > 0, then the super-replication property (A4)(i) holds. Moreover,
when δ 6= 2/(4 +√2), there is a unique competitive equilibrium, which is given by
(q, (xA0 , x
A
1 , z
A), (xB0 , x
B
1 , z
B)) =
(√
2
2
,
(
1 +
√
2
4 +
√
2
, 1− 2
4 +
√
2
,− 2
4 +
√
2
)
,
(
1−
√
2
4 +
√
2
,
2
4 +
√
2
,
2
4 +
√
2
))
for δ > 2/(4 +
√
2); and by
(q, (xA0 , x
A
1 , z
A), (xB0 , x
B
1 , z
B)) =
(
1
8
(√
1 +
16
δ
− 1
)
, (1 + qδ, 1− δ,−δ) , (1− qδ, δ, δ)
)
for δ < 2/(4 +
√
2). When δ = 2/(4 +
√
2) these two combination of prices and allocations are equilibria. Notice that,
the equilibrium asset price diverges as δ goes to zero.
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Example 6. Consider an economy E with two states of nature at the second period S = {u, d}.
There is only one commodity, which is perishable. Two agents, A and B, that only demand the
commodity at the second period,11 are characterized by the following preferences and endowments:
V A(xu, xd) = 2
√
xu + 1 +
√
xd, (w
A
u , w
A
d ) = (1, 1);
V B(xu, xd) =
√
xu + 1 + 2
√
xd, (w
B
u , w
B
d ) = (1, 1).
There are two segmented Arrow securities satisfying R1(p) = (pu, 0), R2(p) = (0, pd). We assume
that, for agent i, Φi(p, q) := {((xiu, xid), (zi1, zi2)) ∈ R2+ × R2 : zi1 + zi2 ≥ 0}.
It is not difficult to verify that Assumptions (A1)-(A3) are satisfied. However, as trading con-
straints requires that zi1 + z
i
2 ≥ 0, the set of unsegmented assets in empty and long-position on seg-
mented Arrow securities cannot be reduced without compromise its financial admissibility. Hence,
Assumption (A4) does not holds.
We affirm that E does not have equilibria.
If there is a competitive equilibrium, the strict monotonicity of preferences ensures that com-
modity and asset prices are strictly positive. Hence, at each state of nature in the second period,
we can use the commodity as numeraire. By contradiction, assume that there is an equilibrium
(q1, q2, ((x
i
u, x
i
d), (z
i
1, z
i
2))i∈{A,B}). Since trading constraints require that z
i
1 + z
i
2 ≥ 0, market feasi-
bility guarantees that α := zA1 = −zA2 = zB2 = −zB1 . Therefore, the strict monotonicity of preferences
implies that (xAu , x
A
d ) = (1 + α, 1− α) and (xBu , xBd ) = (1− α, 1 + α).
It follows that α is the unique element in the following sets:
argmax
α∈[−1,1]: (q1−q2)α=0
2
√
2 + α+
√
1− α, argmax
α∈[−1,1]: (q1−q2)α=0
√
2− α+ 2√1 + α.
Therefore, we have two cases. If q1 = q2, then Inada’s condition implies that α ∈ (−1, 1), while
the first order conditions ensures that
√
2 + α = 2
√
1− α and 2√2− α = √1 + α. However, this
system of equations does not have a solution. Alternatively, if q1 6= q2, then α = 0 and the first
orden conditions of problems above induce a contradiction as
√
2 6= 2. 2
6. Concluding Remarks
In this paper we extend the theory of general equilibrium with incomplete financial markets to
include price-dependent trading constraints that restrict both consumption alternatives and credit
access. Our approach is general enough to incorporate several types of dependencies between prices,
11Our model can be easily modified to include economies where agents only trade assets at t = 0. In fact, it is
sufficient to allow the sets of commodities to depend on the state of nature (Ls)s∈S , making L0 = ∅. In this context,
the existence of a competitive equilibrium can be obtained by identical arguments to those made in the proof of our
main Theorem. Of course, Assumption (A1)(ii) changes because agents do not have physical endowments at t = 0.
In addition, in the statement of the super-replication property the bundle x̂0 disappears.
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consumption, and credit access. For instance, the access to liquidity may depend on individuals
income, the short-sale of derivatives may require the deposit of margins, or borrowers could be
required to pledge physical collateral to protect lenders in case of default.
As we want to include financial segmentation, our results of equilibrium existence do not rely
on financial survival conditions. Thus, based on the idea that asset prices can be bounded when
their promises can be super-replicated at a finite cost, we show equilibrium existence assuming that
investments in non-segmented assets can super-replicate the deliveries of segmented contracts and
that investment in segmented contracts is not required to obtain access to credit.
In our model, investment restrictions can be introduced at the cost of more notation and technical
hypotheses (see Cea-Echenique and Torres-Mart´ınez (2014)). As a matter of future research, we
want to analyze the characteristics of trading constraints that are essential to guarantee equilibrium
existence in economies with more than two periods (cf., Iraola and Torres-Mart´ınez (2014)).
Appendix
Proof of the Proposition.
Under (A1)(ii)(a) and (A2), suppose that (NR) holds. By contradiction, assume that there is a com-
pact set P′ ⊆ P such that ⋃(p,q)∈P′: (p,q)0 Ω(p, q) is unbounded. Hence, there is an unbounded sequence
{((pn, qn), (xin, zin)i∈I)}n∈N ⊆ P′ × EI for which (xin, zin) ∈ Ω(pn, qn), ∀n ∈ N. It follows that, for every n
and i, (W, zin) ∈ Φi(pn, qn), where W = (Ws)s∈S := (
∑
i∈IW
i
s)s∈S . In particular, for some agent h there is
an unbounded subsequence {zhnk}k∈N ⊆ {zhn}n∈N such that, for every k ∈ N, zhnk 6= 0, ‖zhnk‖Σ ≤ ‖zhnk+1‖Σ,
and (W, zhnk ) ∈ Φh(pnk , qnk ).
Let ((p˜, q˜), z˜h) be a cluster point of {(pnk , qnk ), zhnk/‖zhnk‖Σ}k∈N. We want to contradict (NR) by showing
that z˜h 6= 0 belongs to
{
zh ∈ RJ : ∑j∈J Rj(p˜)zhj = 0 ∧ (Wh, δzh) ∈ Φh(p˜, q˜), ∀δ > 0} .
We affirm that
∑
j∈J Rs,j(p˜)z˜
h
j = 0, ∀s ∈ S. First, if there is s ∈ S such that
∑
j∈J Rs,j(p˜)z˜
h
j < 0, then
the compactness of P′ ensures that there is a > 0 such that a
∑
j∈J Rs,j(p˜)z˜
h
j < −2p˜s ·Ws. This implies
that, for k ∈ N large enough, a∑j∈J Rs,j(pnk )zhnk,j/‖zhnk‖Σ < −2pnk,s ·Ws. Since limk ‖zhnk‖Σ = +∞, it
follows that for k large enough
∑
j∈J Rs,j(pnk )z
h
nk,j
< −2pnk,s ·Ws, a contradiction with (xink , zink )i∈I ∈
Ω(pnk , qnk ). Second, if there is s ∈ S such that
∑
j∈J Rs,j(p˜)z˜
h
j > 0, then b
∑
j∈J Rs,j(p˜)z˜
h
j > 2(#I −1)p˜s ·
Ws, for some b > 0. Hence, for k ∈ N large enough, we have that∑j∈J Rs,j(pnk )zhnk,j > 2(#I−1) pnk,s ·Ws.
Due to
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J Rs,j(pnk )z
i
nk,j
= 0, there exists h′ 6= h such that ∑j∈J Rs,j(p˜nk )zh′nk,j < −2 p˜nk,s ·Ws,
a contradiction with (xink , z
i
nk )i∈I ∈ Ω(pnk , qnk ).
Given δ > 0, we affirm that (Wh, δz˜h) ∈ Φh(p˜, q˜). Indeed, given c > 0 there exists kc ∈ N such that
‖zhnk‖Σ ≥ c, ∀k ≥ kc. Hence, as Φh has convex values and (W, 0) ∈ Φh(pnk , qnk ) for every k ∈ N, it follows
that (1− c/‖zhnk‖Σ)(W, 0) + c/‖zhnk‖Σ(W, zhnk ) = (W, c zhnk/‖zhnk‖Σ) ∈ Φh(pnk , qnk ), for any k ≥ k(δ), which
in turn implies that (W, cz˜h) ∈ Φh(p˜, q˜). Furthermore, Assumption (A1)(ii)(a) guarantees that there is
σ ∈ (0, 1) such that, σWs Whs , ∀s ∈ S. Since (1− σ)(0, 0) + σ(W, (δ/σ) z˜h) ∈ Φh(p, q), we conclude that
(Wh, δz˜h) ∈ Φh(p˜, q˜), because Φh(p˜, q˜) + RL×S+ × RJ+ ⊆ Φh(p˜, q˜). 2
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Proof of the Theorem.
Case I. Assume that (A1)(ii)(a) holds.
Given M ∈ N, consider the normalized space of prices P(M) := P0 × [0,M ]Jb × PS1 , where P0 := {y ∈
RL∪Ja+ : ‖y‖Σ = 1}, P1 := {y ∈ RL+ : ‖y‖Σ = 1}, and Jb := J \ Ja.12 Note that, a typical element of
P(M) is of the form (p, q) = ((p0, (qk)k∈Ja), (qj)j∈Jb , (ps)s∈S). When (p, q) ∈ P(M), the commodity price
p = (p0, (ps)s∈S) belongs to P := {y ∈ RL+ : ‖y‖Σ ≤ 1} × PS1 .
Lemma 1. Under Assumptions (A1)(ii)-(iii) and (A2), for every agent i ∈ I the choice set correspondence
Ci : P(M) E is lower hemicontinuous with closed graph and non-empty and convex values.
Proof. Fix i ∈ I. Since for every (p, q) ∈ P the allocation ((W is)s∈S , 0) ∈ Ci(p, q), Ci is non-empty
valued. Assumption (A2) implies that Ci has convex values and closed graph. To prove that Ci is lower
hemicontinuous, let C˚i : P(M)  E be the correspondence that associates to each (p, q) ∈ P(M) the set
of allocations (xi, zi) ∈ Ci(p, q) satisfying budget constraints with strict inequalities. We affirm that C˚i
is lower hemicontinuous and has non-empty values. Since Ci is the closure of C˚i, these properties imply
that Ci is lower hemicontinuous (see Border (1985, 11.19(c))). Thus, to obtain the results it is sufficient to
ensure the claimed properties for C˚i.
Claim A. C˚i has non-empty values. It follows from Assumption (A2) that ((W i0 , (0.5W
i
s)s∈S), 0) ∈ Φi(p, q)
for all (p, q) ∈ P(M). Since W i  0, when p0 6= 0 we always have that ((W i0 , (0.5W is)s∈S), 0) ∈ C˚i(p, q).
Thus, assume that Ja 6= ∅ and fix (p, q) ∈ P(M) such that p0 = 0 and, therefore (qj)j∈Ja 6= 0. By
definition of unsegmented contracts, for every j ∈ Ja there exists δj(p, q) ∈ (0, 1) such that −δj~ej ∈ Φi(p, q)
for all δj ∈ (0, δj(p, q)). Since Φi has convex values, we conclude that there exists δ(p, q) > 0 such that
((W i0 , (0.5W
i
s)s∈S), 0) − δ
∑
j∈Ja ~ej ∈ Φi(p, q), for every δ ∈ (0, δ(p, q)).13 Furthermore, assume that δ ∈
(0, δ(p, q)) satisfies
δ
∑
k∈Ja
max
(p˜,s)∈P×S
Rs,k(p˜) < 0.5 min
(s,l)∈S×L
W is,l.
Then, promises can be honored with the resources that became available after the consumption of 0.5W is .
Therefore, under these requirements, we have that ((W i0 , (0.5W
i
s)s∈S), 0)− δ
∑
j∈Ja ~ej ∈ C˚i(p, q).
Claim B. C˚i is lower hemicontinuous. Fix (p, q) ∈ P(M) and (xi, zi) ∈ C˚i(p, q). Given a sequence
{(pn, qn)}n∈N ⊂ P(M) converging to (p, q), the lower hemicontinuity of Φi (Assumption (A2)) ensures
that there is {(xi(n), zi(n))}n∈N ⊂ E converging to (xi, zi) such that (xi(n), zi(n)) ∈ Φi(pn, qn), ∀n ∈ N.
Thus, for n ∈ N large enough, (xi(n), zi(n)) ∈ C˚i(pn, qn). It follows from the sequential characterization of
hemicontinuity that C˚i is lower hemicontinuous (see Border (1985, 11.11(b))). 2
12Trading constraints are not necessarily homogeneous of degree zero in prices. Consequently, the normalization
of prices may induce a selection of equilibria.
13It is sufficient to consider δ(p, q) := minj∈Ja δj(p, q)/#Ja.
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It follows from Assumption (A3) that, when prices belongs to P(M) and are strictly positive, there is a
finite upper bound for admissible financial positions:
Ω(M) := 2 sup
(p,q)∈P(M):(p,q)0
sup
(xi,zi)i∈I∈Ω(p,q)
∑
i∈I
‖zi‖Σ.
Given (p, q) ∈ P(M), for any i ∈ I we consider the truncated choice set Ci(p, q) ∩K(M), where
K(M) :=
[
0, 2W (M)
]L×S × [−Ω(M), #I Ω(M)]J ,
W (M) :=
#J #I Ω(M) + ∑
(s,l)∈S×L
∑
i∈I
W is,l
(1 + max
(p,s)∈P×S
∑
j∈J
Rs,j(p)
)
.
Let ΨM : P(M)×KI(M) P(M)×KI(M) be the correspondence given by
ΨM (p, q, (x
i, zi)i∈I) = φ0,M ((x
i
0, z
i)i∈I)×
∏
s∈S
φs((x
i
s)i∈I)×
∏
i∈I
φiM (p, q),
where
φ0,M ((x
i
0, z
i)i∈I) := argmax
(p0,q)∈P0×[0,M ]Jb
p0 ·
∑
i∈I
(xi0 − wi0) + q ·
∑
i∈I
zi;
φs((x
i
s)i∈I) := argmax
ps∈P1
ps ·
∑
i∈I
(xis −W is), ∀s ∈ S;
φiM (p, q) := argmax
(xi,zi)∈Ci(p,q)∩K(M)
V i(xi), ∀i ∈ I.
Lemma 2. Under Assumptions (A1)-(A3), ΨM has a non-empty set of fixed points.
Proof. By Kakutani’s Fixed Point Theorem, it is sufficient to to prove that ΨM has a closed graph with
non-empty and convex values. Since P(M) is non-empty, convex and compact, Berge’s Maximum Theorem
establishes that {φ0,M , {φs}s∈S} have a closed graph with non-empty and convex values.
It remains to prove that the same properties hold for {φiM}i∈I . Given i ∈ I, Lemma 1 implies that
Ci has a closed graph with non-empty and convex values. Since K(M) is compact and convex and
((W is)s∈S , 0) ∈ K(M), it follows that (p, q) ∈ P(M)  Ci(p, q) ∩ K(M) has a closed graph and non-empty,
compact, and convex values. The proof of Lemma 1 also ensures that Ci is lower hemicontinuous and
((W is)s∈S , 0) ∈ Ci(p, q)∩ int(K(M)), where int(K(M)) denotes the interior of K(M) relative to RL×S+ ×RJ .
As (p, q) ∈ P(M)  int(K(M)) has open graph, it follows that (p, q) ∈ P(M)  Ci(p, q) ∩ int(K(M)) is
lower hemicontinuous (see Border (1985, 11.21(c))). Therefore, (p, q) ∈ P(M)  Ci(p, q) ∩ K(M) is lower
hemicontinuous too (see Border (1985, 11.19(c))). Berge’s Maximum Theorem and the continuity and quasi-
concavity of V i guarantees that φiM satisfies the required properties. 2
Since Assumption (A4) holds, there exists (x̂0, ẑ) that super-replicates the financial payments of seg-
mented contracts when prices are in the compact set P(M). Notice that (x̂0, ẑ) is independent of M ,
because financial payments are independent of asset prices. Let Q := max
{
1, 2
(
‖x̂0‖Σ + max
k∈Ja
ẑk
)}
.
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Lemma 3. Under (A1)(i), (A1)(iii) and (A4), let (p, q, (xi, zi)i∈I) be a fixed point of ΨM such that,
p 0,
∑
i∈I
zik ≤ 0, ∀k ∈ Ja;
∑
i∈I
xis,l < 2W (M), ∀(s, l) ∈ S × L.
Then, for any j ∈ Jb we have that,
qj > 0 ∧
∑
i∈I
zij > 0 =⇒ qj ≤ Q .
Proof. Let j ∈ Jb such that qj > 0 and
∑
i∈I z
i
j > 0. Due to p 0, it follows from Assumption (A1)(iii)
that Rj(p) 6= 0. Hence, there is s′ ∈ S such that ∑r∈Jb Rs′,r(p) ≥ Rs′,j(p) > 0.
Fix δ ∈ (0, 1). By Assumption (A4), it follows that∑
r∈Jb
Rs′,r(p) < (1 + δ)
(
ps′ · Ys′ x̂0 +
∑
k∈Ja
Rs′,k(p)ẑk
)
≤ (1 + δ)
(
ps′ · Ys′ x̂0 +
(
max
k∈Ja
ẑk
) ∑
k∈Ja
Rs′,k(p)
)
.
We affirm that,
qj ≤ (1 + δ)
(
p0 · x̂0 +
(
max
k∈Ja
ẑk
) ∑
k∈Ja
qk
)
.
Let i be an agent that invests in asset j. Since long positions on j can be reduced without affect the
financial admissibility (Assumption (A4)(ii)), if the inequality above does not hold, then there is ε > 0 such
that, agent i can reduce her long position on asset j in εzij units, change her first-period consumption to
xi0 + (1 + δ)εz
i
j x̂0, and increase in (1 + δ)(maxr∈Ja ẑr)εz
i
j units the investment in each k ∈ Ja.14
With this strategy, i changes her wealth at state of nature s ∈ S by(
(1 + δ)
(
ps · Ysx̂0 +
(
max
k∈Ja
ẑk
) ∑
k∈Ja
Rs,k(p)
)
−Rs,j(p)
)
εzij ≥ 0,
where the last inequality is a consequence of the super-replication property and holds as strict inequality for
s = s′. Since agent i has locally non-satiated preferences (Assumption (A1)(i)), we contradict the optimality
of (xi, zi) on Ci(p, q) ∩K(M). We conclude that qj ≤ Q. 2
Lemma 4. Under Assumptions (A1)-(A4), for any M > Q the fixed points of ΨM are competitive equilibria.
Proof. Given M > Q, let (p, q, (xi, zi)i∈I) be a fixed point of ΨM . Adding first period budget constraints
across agents, the definition of φ0,M guarantees that,
p0 ·
∑
i∈I
(xi0 − wi0) + q ·
∑
i∈I
zi ≤ p0 ·
∑
i∈I
(xi0 − wi0) + q ·
∑
i∈I
zi ≤ 0, ∀ (p0, q) ∈ P0 × [0,M ]Jb .
Hence, ∑
i∈I
(xi0 − wi0) ≤ 0,
∑
i∈I
zik ≤ 0, ∀k ∈ Ja,
and qj = M for every j ∈ Jb such that
∑
i∈I z
i
j > 0. Furthermore, adding individual budget constraints at
any state of nature in the second period, the definition of K(M) guarantees that,
ps ·
∑
i∈I
(xis −W is) ≤ ps ·
∑
i∈I
(xis −W is) ≤W (M), ∀ps ∈ P1, ∀s ∈ S.
14As the new strategy needs to be on K(M), the value of ε may depend on (M, qj , xi0, (zik)k∈Ja , z
i
j).
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We obtain that
∑
i∈I x
i
s,l < 2W (M), ∀(s, l) ∈ S × L, which implies that p  0. In another case, if
ps,l = 0 for some (s, l) ∈ S × L, then Assumption (A1)(ii) guarantees that at least one agent can improve
her utility by increasing her consumption without additional costs. A contradiction to the optimality of
plans (xi, zi)i∈I .
The strict positivity of commodity prices has several consequences. First, by Assumption (A1)(iii) asset
promises are non-trivial. Thus, (A1)(i) and the absence of restrictions on investment ensure that asset prices
are strictly positive. Second, as (p, q, (xi, zi)i∈I) satisfies the hypotheses of Lemma 3 and M > Q, we obtain
that
∑
i∈I z
i ≤ 0. Third, Assumption (A1)(i) guarantees that budget constraints are satisfied by equality.
We conclude that,
(p, q) ∈ P(Q), (p, q) 0,
∑
i∈I
(xi − (W is)s∈S) = 0,
∑
i∈I
zi = 0,
and Assumption (A3) implies that (xi, zi)i∈I ∈ Ω(p, q) ∩ int(K(M)).15
Since for any i ∈ I the allocation (xi, zi) belongs to Ci(p, q) ∩ int(K(M)), given (xi, zi) ∈ Ci(p, q) with
xi 6= xi there exists λ ∈ (0, 1) such that λ(xi, zi)+(1−λ)(xi, zi) ∈ Ci(p, q)∩K(M). The strict quasi-concavity
of utility functions (Assumption (A1)(i)) implies that V i(λ(xi, zi) + (1− λ)(xi, zi)) > min{V i(xi), V i(xi)}.
Since (xi, zi) ∈ φiM (p, q), we obtain that V i(xi) < V i(xi).
Therefore, (xi, zi) is an optimal choice for agent i in Ci(p, q). 2
Case II. Assume that (A1)(ii)(b) holds.
Denote by E the original economy and let i be an agent with strictly monotonic preferences and interior
endowments. For any n ∈ N, consider the economy En obtained from E by just perturbing aggregated
individual endowments, which become W in := W
i and W kn := W
k + n−1W i, ∀k 6= i.
It follows from Case I that, for every n ∈ N, there exists an equilibrium for the economy En satisfying
(p(n), q(n), (xk(n), zk(n))k∈I) ∈ P(Q)×K(Q)I and (p(n), q(n)) 0. Also, since P(Q)×K(Q)I is a compact
set, there exists a subsequence {(p(nr), q(nr), (xk(nr), zk(nr))k∈I)}r∈N ⊆ {(p(n), q(n), (xk(n), zk(n))k∈I)}n∈N
converging to some (p, q, (xk, zk)k∈I) ∈ P(Q) × K(Q)I . Notice that, by construction, (xk, zk)k∈I satisfies
market feasibility conditions and Assumption (A2) ensures that (xk, zk) ∈ Ck(p, q) for each agent k ∈ I.
We affirm that (xi, zi) is an optimal choice for agent i at prices (p, q). Indeed, assume by contradiction
that there is (xi, zi) ∈ Ci(p, q) such that V i(xi) > V i(xi). Then it follows from the continuity of preferences,
the interiority of endowments W i, and the convexity of Φi that there are θ ∈ (0, 1) and ρ ≥ 0 satisfying
V i
(
θxi + (1− θ)
(
wi0
2
, 0
))
> V i(xi),
θ(xi, zi) + (1− θ)
((
wi0
2
, 0
)
, (−ρ)j∈Ja
)
∈ Φi(p, q),
0.25 min
(s,l)∈S×L
W is,l ≥ ρ max
p∈P1
max
j∈Ja
Rs,j(p),
15Along the proof of the Theorem, (A3) is only required to ensure that
[
(p, q) 0 ∧ (xi, zi)i∈I ∈ Ω(p, q)
]
=⇒
(xi, zi)i∈I ∈ int(K(M)). In fact, if we change the upper bound Ω(M) for an arbitrary positive number in the definition
of K(M), then all the other arguments in the proof of Theorem 1 still hold.
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and, therefore,
(xi(θ, ρ), zi(θ, ρ)) := θ(xi, zi) + (1− θ)
((
wi0
2
, 0
)
, (−ρ)j∈Ja
)
∈ C˚i(p, q).16
Since (p(nr), q(nr)) →r (p, q) and V i(xi(θ, ρ)) > V i(xi), the lower hemicontinuity of C˚i (see the proof of
Lemma 1) implies that for r large enough there is (x˜i(r), z˜i(r)) ∈ C˚i(p(nr), q(nr)) such that V i(x˜i(r)) >
V i(xi(nr)), which contradicts the optimality of (x
i(nr), z
i(nr)). Therefore, (x
i, zi) is an optimal choice for
agent i in Ci(p, q). Since V i is strictly increasing, we also conclude that p 0.17
The strict positivity of commodity prices guarantees that every agent can obtain resources from selling her
endowments. Thus, by analogous arguments to those made above for the case of agent i—taking ρ = 0—we
can prove that (xk, zk) is an optimal choice for agent k 6= i at prices (p, q).
We conclude that (p, q, (xk, zk)k∈I) is a competitive equilibrium for E . 2
Proof of Corollary 1. To prove equilibrium existence, it is sufficient to guarantee that the super-
replication property of Assumption (A4) is satisfied when commodity prices belongs to P. Let J ∗a ⊆ Ja
be the set of unsegmented contracts that satisfies the requirements imposed in the statement of Corol-
lary 1. Then, the super-replication property holds by choosing x̂0 = 0; ẑk = 0, ∀k ∈ Ja \ J ∗a ; and
ẑk = max
s∈Sk
max
p∈P
( ∑
j∈Jb
Rs,j(p)/Rs,k(p)
)
, ∀k ∈ J ∗a . 2
Proof of Corollary 2. We will guarantee that the super-replication property holds when commodity
prices belongs to P. Since assets are real and payments are given in terms of commodities in L∗, for any
j ∈ J \ Ja there is a function As,j : RL×S+ → RL+ such that Rs,j(p) = ps · As,j(p) and (As,j)l = 0, ∀l /∈ L∗.
Thus, when commodity prices belongs to P, we can super-replicate financial payments of asset in J \Ja by
choosing (ẑk)k∈Ja = 0 and x̂0 = a(1, . . . , 1), where a > 0 satisfies
max
l∈L∗
max
(p,s)∈P×Ŝ
∑
j∈J\Ja
(As,j(p))l < a min
(s,l)∈Ŝ×L∗
Ys(l, l)
and Ŝ :=
⋃
j∈J Sj are the states of nature in which assets make promises. 2
Proof of Corollary 3. Since assets are backed by physical collateral, it is possible to super-replicate
financial payments by choosing (ẑk)k∈Ja = 0 and x̂0 =
∑
j∈J Cj . Therefore, Assumption (A4)(i) holds
when commodity prices belongs to P and it suffices to obtain equilibrium existence as a consequence of the
proof of the Theorem. 2
16At this stage, we do not know if p0 6= 0. Hence, to obtain an allocation in the interior of her choice set, agent
i may need to increase her debt on non-segmented assets by choosing ρ > 0. This action is compatible with trading
and budget constraints because zi was reduced in a (1− θ) percent and W i  0.
17Notice that, (xi, zi) ∈ int(K(Q)) as a direct consequence of the market feasibility of (xk, zk)k∈I .
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